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Waiting by the Phone: Why Telephone Number Mnemonics
Warrant Trademark Protection
Telephone number mnemonics, hereinafter referred to as mnemonics, are an
increasingly popular method of advertising a business' phone number by utilizing
the letters on the telephone keypad to spell words or short phrases. Many
businesses in the information age have used mnemonics to distinguish their
phone numbers, and corresponding services, from competing numbers.'
Mnemonics are popular with many businesses, because a seven letter word
is easier for the average consumer to remember than a seven digit number.2 In
many industries, telecommunications is the primary link between the consumer
and the producerA Hot lines, telephone psychics, phone sales, and long distance
phone services are but a few of the businesses conducted solely over the
telephone. Consumers in these markets do not go to a store or other traditional
outlet to conduct business. Often, these consumers only know of the business by
the telephone number.4 For these intangible players, the mnemonic is a
powerful marketing tool.
So widely used are these marketing tools, that, as phone sales, hot lines, and
other telecommunications-based markets have expanded, the traditional toll-free
means of communication, the 1-800 phone number, has been exhausted. In order
to keep up with the demand for toll-free telecommunications, the Federal
Communications Commission has had to approve a new toll free area code, 1-
888.3
The saturation of the business world with telecommunications-driven
markets has created an interesting problem in trademark law. Simply put, the
question is: can these mnemonics be protected as trademarks? The federal
circuits have split over this issue for a variety of reasons. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page,6 found these
mnemonics worthy of trademark protection, but did not evaluate the strength of
the mark presented.7 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Dranoff-Perlstein
Associates v. Sklar,8 found that such mnemonics are not subject to trademark
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
i. Some examples include 1-800-COLLECT (MCI's collectcalling service), 1-800-CLARITIN
(an information hot line for the prescription drug Claritin), and of course 1-800-FLOWERS (a
nationwide delivery network for floral arrangements).
2. Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1989).
3. 1-800 COLLECT (MCI's collect calling service), i-800-THE-CARD (American Express'
phone application number for the American Express Card), and 1-800-GO-U-HAUL (U-Haul's
nationwide reservation number) are but a few examples of these numbers as important links between
consumer and provider. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57 and 204-206.
4. For example, 1-800-FLOWERS is both the name of that business and its telephone number.
The mnemonic is not associated with any other identifying name or symbol.
5. United Communications Group Telecommunications Alert, "888 Begins Today" (March.
1, 1996).
6. Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1989).
7. See Infra text accompanying notes 131-151.
8. 967 F.2d 852, 857 (3d Cir. 1992).
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protection when they utilize generic terms. Recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals joined the fray, while deciding another issue,9 in Holiday Inns Inc. v.
800 Reservation Inc. '
This paper evaluates the mnemonic as a trademark and addresses the narrow
issue of whether mnemonics that spell generic terms should be protected under
trademarklaw. In Part I, unfair competition is investigated as a concurrentmeans
of protecting this new marketing implement. Part II reviews the tools available
under current trademark law and how they can be applied to mnemonics. The
treatment of mnemonics in the federal circuits is the subject of Part III, and Part
IV addresses other scholars' comments on mnemonics as trademarks. Finally, Part
V offers guidelines as to how trademark law and unfair competition law can be
used to protect mnemonics, particularly those that spell out generic terms.
I. UNFAIR COMPETITION' AS A MEANS OF PROTECTION
.Unfair competition is a commercial tort used by courts to regulate the
morality of the competitive model." Beyond that, it is difficult to define."
While trademark protection focuses on similarities in the marks held by the
parties, unfair competition looks to the totality of the evidence. 3 The law of
unfair competition has remained broad in order to provide courts with a flexible
tool. Unfair competition has been able to adapt to the changing business world,
because it allows courts a great deal of discretion to determine what sorts of
practices are acceptable. 4 What constitutes unfair competition is generally
determined on a case-by case basis.'5
Like any other tort claim, claims of unfair competition must set forth an
injury caused by the defendant.' Once that has been shown, the court can use
the flexible tool of unfair competition to determine if the defendant's actions were
"unfair.",17 Conduct is considered "unfair" when it involves fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, deception, breach of fiduciary duty, or. comparably unethical conduct.
Practices that "offend public policy" or are "immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers"' 9 are also deemed
"unfair." While the breadth of these modifiers gives a court plenty of room to
9. See Infra text accompanying notes 172-197.
10. 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996).
11. J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 1:3. at 12 (2d ed. 1984).
12. Id.
13. See Corporate Risk Int'l Inc. v. Assicurazioni Generali, No. 95-1440-A, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19720, at *7 (E.D.Va. March 15, 1996).
14. McCarthy, supra note 11, §§ 1:3-1:4, at 12-16.
15. Faris Wyatt v. P02, Inc., 651 So. 2d 359, 361 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
16. McCarthy, supra note II, § 1:12, at 28. •
'17. Gilbert/Robinson Inc. v. Carrie Beverage-Missouri Inc.,'758 F. Supp. 512, 527 (E.D. Mo.
1991).
18. Wyatt, 651 So. 2d at 361.
19. Id.
[Vol. 58
COMMENTS
maneuver, their vagueness places a significant burden upon the plaintiff in an
unfair competition claim.
To prevail on an unfair competition claim, a plaintiff must first prove he was
injured commercially, and then prove that the injury was caused by the unfair
actions of the defendant. In the commercial arena, injuries are generally lost
profits which are tremendously difficult to attribute to any one competitor and his
actions.20 Assuming that the plaintiff can overcome this burden, he must then
argue that the defendant's actions that caused this injury were "unfair."2'
Unfair competition is easier to define by example than in the abstract."
Among things labeled unfair competition are: trademark infringement; use of
similar corporate, business or professional names; simulation of product
configuration; simulation of trade dress; "palming off" goods by substituting one
brand for the brand ordered; and theft of trade secrets." These individual torts
are all species within the genus of unfair competition.2
Claims of unfair competition are available at both the state and federal levels.
At the state level, laws against unfair trade practices exist in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia. 25 At the federal level, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Ace,
provides a federal statutory unfair competition tort, sui generis.
A number of state statutes can be utilized to address unfair competition.
Many states have adopted laws based on the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.28 These provisions provide relief for passing off, disparagement, use of
false designations of origin, and other forms of unfair competition. 29 States also
prohibit unfair competition through consumer protection statutes, closely modeled
on Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 30 which are designed
to protect the public against both unfair competitionand deceptive trade practices.3'
20. McCarthy, supra note 11, § 1:12, at 29.
21. Gilbert, 758 F. Supp. at 527.
22. McCarthy, supra note II, § 1:5, at 16.
23. Id. at 16-17.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § I statutory note (1995).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1995).
27. Doris E. Long, Unfair Competition and the Lanham Act 17 (1993).
28. See. e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-101 to -114 (West 1996); Del. Code Ann. fit. 6, §§
2531-2537 (1993); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-370 to -375 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 481A-1 to -5
(Michie 1995); 805 III. Comp. Stat. Ann. 510I1-5107 (West 1993); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 §§
1211-1216 (West 1964); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 325D.43-.48 (West 1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 87-301
to -306 (1994); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358A (1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-1 to -22 (Michie
1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4165.01-.04 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); Okla. Stat. tit. 78, §§ 51-55
(West 1995); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 646.605-.656 (1987); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6.13.1-1 to -19 (1992); Tex.
Bus. & Com. Code §§ 17.41-.826 (West 1987).
29. Long, supra note 27, at 332.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1997).
31. Long, supra note 27, at 333. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. §§ 45.50-471 to -561 (Michie 1996);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-1521 to -1534 (West 1994); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-101 to -112 (Michie
1996); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§§ 17000-17101 (West 1997);Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-101 to-l17
1997)
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Whether at the state or federal level, unfair competition claims compliment
trademark infringement claims nicely. In the realm of mnemonic marks, unfair
competition may be used to protect mnemonic users who are not able to achieve
trademark rights. For instance, mnemonics that spell generic terms are likely to
be held unprotectable as generic marks, particularly in the Third Circuit."
Other mnemonic holders may seek redress for a competitor's use of a confusing-
ly similar phone number, but not a mnemonic. Both of these situations might
well be beyond the scope of trademark protection available to mnemonics, but
they could be remedied by unfair competition actions.
While the broad genus of unfair competition offers uncertainty to a
mnemonic holder seeking to protect his mnemonic from competitors, one of its
species, "passing off," is an especially viable means of protection. "The
gravamen of unfair competition is passing off one's own goods or services as
those of another amounting to fraud."33 Passing off has long been recognized
as a means of relief at common law." Passing off is generally a misrepresenta-
tion of a product's origin." There are no technical requirements as to how the
misrepresentation is made." It may happen at the point of sale through labels
or packaging, or in advertisements via radio, TV, or catalogs.3" It may be
written, oral, or even inferred from a competitor's conduct.3 With such a
broad range of vehicles for passing off, use of a telephone number could
certainly be a means of deceiving consumers.
(West 1996); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-1 10a to - 1I0q (West 1992); Del. Code Ann. fit. 6, §§ 2511-2527
(1993); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 28-3901 to -3909(1996); Fla. Slat. Ann. §§ 501.201 to .213 (West 1997);
Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1 -390 to -407 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 480-2 (Michie 1995); Idaho Code
§ 48-601 (1977); 815 I1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/1-505/12 (West 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-623 to -
643 (1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); La. R.S. 51:1401-1418 (1987); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. it. 5, §§ 206-214 (West 1964); Md. Code Ann. Com. Law §§ 13-301 to -316 (1996);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93A, §§ 1-11 (Law Co-op. 1994); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.901-.922
(West 1989); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-24-1 to -131 (1972); Mo..Ann. Stat. §§ 407.010 to .020 (West
1990); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-101 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 59-1601 to -1623 (1993); N.H. Rev.
StaLt. Ann. §§ 358-A:1 to A:13 (1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-1 to -48 (West 1989); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 57-12-2 (Michie 1970); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (McKinney 1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(1994); N.D. Cent. Code ch. 51-10 (1989); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ch. 1345 (Banks-Baldwin 1993);
Okla.' Stat. Ann. fit. 15, §§ 751-789 (West 1993); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 to 9.2 (West 1993);
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 to -5-160 (Law Co-op. 1976); S.D. Codified Laws § 37-24-6 (Michie
1994); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101 to -18-121 (1995); Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-5-1 to -5-18 (1995);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 2451-2462 (1993); Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-196 to.1-207 (Michie 1992); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.86.010-.920 (West 1989); W. Va. Code § 46A-6-101 to- 10 (1996); Wis Stat.
Ann. § 100.20 (West 1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-12-101 to -12-112 (Michie 1997).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 152-171.
33. T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. v. International Restaurant Group, Inc., 569 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir.
1978).
34. Long, supra note 27, at 213-14.
35. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 4 (1995).
36. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 2 cmt. g (1995).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Passing off, like many forms of unfair competition, is much broader in scope
than trademark infringement.39 Most elements of trademark infringement are
also relevant to unfair competition.4 For instance, both trademark infringement
and unfair competition can arise from the use of a similar mark. In unfair
competition, however, use of such a mark is probative of intent.4 While intent
is neither necessary for, nor conclusive of, unfair competition, it is probative of
unfair competition and thus relevant.42 On the other hand, intent is irrelevant
to trademark infringement." An unfair competition claim can succeed where
one for trademark infringement would fail. If a competitor intends "to ensnare
buyers by use of a similar mark, he may be unsuccessful enough at his
simulation to be free of liability under the trademark laws."" His intent to fool
buyers may, however, be probative of unfair competition and therefore allow a
successful unfair competition claim."5 Because unfair competition can act as
this "safety net," the claims compliment each other, particularly in the uncertain
field of mnemonic marks.
A claim for passing off would help mnemonic holders in those jurisdictions
where mnemonics that spell generic terms are not protected." Even though
these jurisdictions will not allow trademark protection because they deem such
a mark generic, this holding does not foreclose a claim for unfair competition.47
In these juridictions the practitioner may be forced to rely on unfair competition
in lieu of trademark protection.
Those jurisdictions that might protect a mnemonic utilizing a generic terms
will still only protect a mnemonic from a limited form of infringement.49 If a
holder of a mnemonic mark is faced with a competitor who is using a similar
phone number but is not advertising it as a mnemonic, or a competitor whose
mnemonic is similar but not confusingly so, that holder will not likely prevail in
an action for trademark infringement. Because unfair competition encompasses
a wide range of practices generally described as a misappropriation of the skill,
expenditures and labor of another,5" the mnemonic holder may still prevail
under an unfair competition theory.
39. B.H. Bunn Co. Inc. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1264 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Such as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967
F.2d 852, 857 (3d Cir. 1992).
47. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1989).
48. Such as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v.
Page, 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
49. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996).
50. See American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co.. 609 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1979).
1997]
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II. TRADEMARK PROTECTION [N GENERAL
Trademark law is a subset of the general law of unfair competition."' While
unfair competition focuses on the bad faith of and confusion created by a
competitor, trademark law focuses on protecting certain rights generated through
commercial marks, 2 regardless of the intent of the infringing mark holder.
Both consumers and producers benefit from trademarks. Trademarks are
identifying devices that inform the consumer of the identity of the producer of the
good or service marked. 3 They also act as a symbol of quality. Trademarks
guarantee to the consumer that all goods that carry the same mark are of the same
quality.54 Therefore, ifa consumer enjoys his experience with a good or service
and notices its mark, he will select similarly marked items the next time he needs
that good or service. When that mark is protected from confusingly similar marks,
the consumer is assured that he will get consistent quality from other goods or
services carrying a familiar mark." Moreover, if he is dissatisfied with a marked
good or service, the consumer can easily seek redress from the producer, because
the trademark identifies the source of that good or service.
Mnemonics often fulfill these same roles. As a clever label for a phone
service, mnemonics identify the source of that service. In industries where much
of the consumer's interaction with the producer is over the phone, the mnemonic
acts as a system of quality control, because it is a consistent identifier of the
source of that service.
1-800-COLLECT, MCI's collect calling service, is an excellent example of
how mnemonics serve this dual function. A consumer who needs to make a
collect call does not go to a store to purchase such a service. His choice is made
as he faces the phone and dials one of the variety of numbers that will connect him
to a collect call server.56 When he dials 1-800-COLLECT, he has chosen one
among many sources, perhaps as a result of MCI's massive advertising of the
mnemonic. If his experience with the service is satisfactory, he will associate the
good experience with the mnemonic. In fact, he has no other mark to associate
with the experience, because, unlike traditional goods and services, he can use the
service from any phone anywhere. There are no signs or storefronts to carry
marks with which to associate the service. His only idenitifiable link with the
producer is the mnemonic. The mnemonic both denotes the source of the service
and guarantees consistent quality. In short, 1-800-COLLECT has fulfilled both
of these trademark functions.
Not all mnemonics fit the trademark mold so neatly. Many industries do not
use phone sales or phone services as the focus of their business, but still use
51. Freedom Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Way, 583 F. Supp 544, 552 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
52. McCarthy, supra note 11, § 2:2, at 51.
53. McCarthy, supra note 11, § 3:2, at 107.
54. McCarthy, supra note 11, § 3:4, at 111-12.
55. McCarthy, supra note I1, § 3:4, at 113.
56. Such numbers include 1-800-COLLECT, 1-800-CALL-ATI, 1-800-PIN-DROP (Sprint).
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mnemonics. Thesebusinesses will have some difficulty protecting their mnemonic
as a trademark, because it is not acting as a trademark.57 Others whose mnemon-
ic marks are weak may alsohave difficulty distinguishing their mnemonics from
others. Furthermore, competitors may infringe on a mnemonic mark yet not fall
into the narrow scope of trademark infringement." In these situations, unfair
competition law remains available as a means of protection from unscrupulous
competitors.
Trademark cases are often very similar to unfair competition cases because
of trademark law's relationship to the law of unfair competition. 9 Unfair
competition looks beyond the competing marks at all aspects of the parties' selling
efforts.' Unfair competition, however, generally focuses on the unfairness of
the totality of the defendant's acts.' In trademark law, only the exclusive
symbol held forth as a trademark and the competing mark are used to determine
whether or not consumers will likely be confused. 2 Trademarks have some
aspects of property ownership, such as a right to exclude other users of a mark, but
are not viewed solely as property. 3
Trademarks are created and regulated throughout the United States by the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946." Using its power to regulate interstate
commerce, Congress granted substantive and procedural rights in trademarks and
against unfair competition." The procedural right is in the form of federal
registry with the Patent and Trademark Office.' Substantive rights, which are
available to both registered and unregistered marks,67 are governed by the use of
trademark infringement" or unfair competition claims."
Because the status of mnemonics as trademarks is currently dubious, most, if
not all, claims of infringement of a mnemonic will be brought by holders of
unregistered mnemonic marks. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides the
holder of an unregistered trademark an action against competitors who have
confused or are likely to confuse the consumer through the use of a mark that is
the same or substantially similar to the holder's. 70 Any claim for trademark
57. See infra text accompanying notes 202-205.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 172-196.
59. Freedom Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 583 F. Supp. 544, 552 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
60. McCarthy, supra note II, j 2:2, at 53.
61. See National Artists Management Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
62. McCarthy, supra note 11, § 2:2, at 52.
63. Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, Laredo v. Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, Austin, 909 F.2d 839,
843 (5h Cir. 1990).
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1123 (Supp. 1997).
65. McCarthy, supra note 11, § 5:4, at 141.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (Supp. 1997).
67. 15 U.S.C. §01051, 1123, 1125 (Supp. 1997).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (infringement of registered marks); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1997)
(infringement of unregistered marks).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
70. Section 43 of the Lanham Act provides:
19971
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infringement must satisfy two requirements. First, the plaintiffmust establish that
his mark is capable of protection.7 Second, he must establish that, because of
the infringer's actions, there is a likelihood of confusion in the market betweenhis
goods and the infringer's goods.72 It is the first stage that relies nn the four
categories of distinctiveness.
A. The Four Categories of Distinctiveness
"The threshold issue in any action for trademark infringement is whether the
word or phrase is [protectable]."' 3 Not all marks are subject to protection, and
those that are protected fall into a hierarchy of distinctiveness."' The courts have
delineated four categoriesofmarks to determine distinctiveness of a trademarkand
its subsequent protection.75 These categories are, from strongest to weakest: (1)
arbitrary or fanciful; (2) suggestive; (3) descriptive; and (4) generic.' 6 These
categories "tend to blur at the edges" and are "more advisory than definitional."
7
Nonetheless, the court's categorization of a mark will dictate whether and to what
extent it can be protected.
Arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks are protected automatically, without
any showing of secondary meaning.'" Descriptive marks can only be protected
(a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely
to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1997).
71. Registration creates a presumption of validity, so those actions under § 32 often go straight
to the second element. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1123 (Supp. 1997).
72. Tripleedge Prods. Inc. v. Whitney Resources Ltd., 735 F. Supp. 1154, 1161 (E.D.N.Y.
1990); Gilbert/Robinson Inc. v. Carrie Beverage-Missouri Inc., 758 F. Supp. 512, 521 (E.D. Mo.
1991).
73. Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc. 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983).
74. Id.
75. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. klar, 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992). See also Abercrombie
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) and Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove
Smokehouse Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983).
76. Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 855.
77. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790.
78. Dranoff-Peristein, 967 F.2d at 859 (quoting AJ. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291,
297 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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if they have developed secondary meaning.79 Generic marks are those marks that
are so descriptive that they cannot acquire secondary meaning and are therefore
unprotectable.'
The most important result of categorization is whether the mark will require
a showing of secondary meaning in order to receive protection. "The concept of
secondary meaning recognizes that words with an ordinary and primarymeaning
of their own 'may by long use with a particular product, come to be known by the
public as specifically designating that product."'81 Quite simply, secondary
meaning is the association, made by the public, of the mark with the product."2
Secondary meaning can only be generatedby continuous and exclusive use of the
mark in commerce."3 This shift in the public perception is unnecessary for
arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks and is irrelevant to generic marks, but is
pivotal for descriptive marks to be protected." Secondary meaning also
delineates the limits of protection."5
The strongest of the four categories is comprised of those marks which are
arbitrary or fanciful. Marks that fall into this category are always protected in the
geographic and product markets of relevance. 6 Arbitrary marks are those marks
that utilize an existing dictionary word to identify a product, but use the term out
of its normal context.'7 Arbitrary terms "bear no relationship to the products or
services to which they are applied."" Because the term is not normally associat-
ed with the product, only that association generated by its use in commerce can
exist. "Tiger," used as a mark for hot sauce, is an example of an arbitrary mark.
Fanciful marks are those marks that consist of made up or nonsense words.'9
These marks can only be associated with the producer because they would not
exist had he not created them. "Twinkies" and "Ho-Ho's" are examples of
fanciful marks. Marks of this category are always protected and receive the most
extensive protection available. 90
The second category, suggestive marks, are those marks that utilize terms
describing the product, or a quality thereof, but require some imagination on the
part of the consumer to be associated with the good.9' These terms "suggest
rather than describe some particular characteristic" of the goods or services
79. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791.
80. Id.
81. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791 (quoting Volkswagenwerk Akiengesellschafl v. Rickard, 492
F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1974)).
82. Long, supra note 27, at 67.
83. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 858 (3d Cir. 1992).
84. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791.
85, Id. at 796.
86. Dranoff-Peristein, 967 F.2d at 855.
87. McCarthy, supra note II, § 11:4, at 439.
88. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791.
89. McCarthy, supra note 11, § 11:3, at 436.
90. Id.
91. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791.
1997)
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marked and, therefore, force the consumer to "exercise the imagination in order
to draw a conclusion as to the nature of the goods [or] services."' Thus, the
association is substantially assisted, but not quite created, by the creator of the
mark. "Arrid" antiperspirant is an example of a suggestive mark. Such marks are
protected without requiring the plaintiff to show that the mark has acquired any
secondary meaning."
Descriptive marks are those marks describing a product or a quality of a
product in a way that requires little or no imagination on the part of the consumer
to be associated with the product.'4 The line between suggestive marks and
descriptive marks is often difficult to discern." Descriptive marks are not
normally protectable as trademarks, but may become sufficiently distinctive if they
have acquired secondary meaning." "Beachwood Aged," used to describe
Budweiser Beer, is an example of a descriptive mark that has acquired secondary
meaning.
Generic marks are so weak that they are never protected. 7 If a mark is
found to be generic, it fails the threshold requirement of distinctiveness, and the
court will not evaluate the likelihood of confusion between the parties' goods or
services." Generic terms "connote[s] the 'basic nature of articles or services'
rather than the more individualized characteristics of a particular model. 99
Generic marks are those terms that are so vital to describing or naming the product
itself that they cannot be separated from the product."° To allow one producer
the exclusive use of such a term would unfairly disadvantage all other produc-
ers. '0 For example, a producer of soft drinks could not obtain trademark
protection for the word "soda." If one producer had the exclusive use of "soda,"
then all other producers of carbonated soft-drinks would have no adequate way to
name their own products. Generic terms are never protected because "even
complete 'success ... in securing public identification ... cannot deprive
competing manufacturers of the product the right to call an article by its
name."""2 Similarly, some qualities of products are so necessary to the market
as a whole that they must remain available to all producers.0 3 Therefore, rot
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 790.
95. McCarthy, supra note II, § 11:21, at 491.
96. Zataralns, 698 F.2d at 790.
97. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 856 (3d Cir. 1992).
98. Id.
99. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790 (quoting American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins.
Co., 494 F.2d 3, 10 (5th Cir. 1974)).
100. McCarthy, supra note II, § 12:1, at 520.
101. Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 857; AJ. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 306
(3d Cir. 1986).
102. Dranoff-Perstein, 967 F.2d at 855 (quoting A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291,
297 (3d Cir. 1986)).
103. McCarthy, supra note 11, § 12:2, at 526.
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only is "soda" incapable of being protected, but "grpe," "orange," and "lemon-
lime" are also terms that are generic within the soft drink market.'0
The market for the service or product marked has tremendous bearing on
which category a product's mark falls into. A market is defined by geographic
aspects and product aspects.'03 Some marks are limited by geography, particu-
larly those held by small local businesses. If two producers use similar marks but
at opposite ends of the globe, geography keeps them from infringing on each
other. The product itself also dictates the market. The same term may be used by
two different producers if their products are sufficiently different. For instance,
Microsoft makes entertainment software called "Close Combat." "Combat" is also
a mark for roach and ant traps. These marks offer no confusion to the consumer
because the products are so diverse; therefore, neither party would claim
trademark infringement as to the other party.
B. The Four Categories and their Application to Telephone Number
Mnemonics
The trademark categories become difficult to apply in the context of
telephone number mnemonics. Under traditional analysis, the term is evaluated
in relation to the product or service. If that relationship is artificial, as is the
case for arbitrary terms, the mark is source-indicative and therefore protected.
If the relationship is natural, as is the case for generic terms, the mark merely
denotes what the product is without denoting the source and must remain
available to competitors. Often the relationship is in the gray area between these
two poles, and courts must place them in the spectrum of suggestive or
descriptive.
With mnemonics, the mark labels a means of communicating with the
producer and is thus inherently source-indicative. Additionally, the product in
most telephone mnemonic cases is more complex than a simple good or service.
For instance, 1-800-FLOWERS is a mnemonic that uses the term "flowers,"
which is arguably generic in the floral industry. However, in the context of that
firm's business, 1-800-'FLOWERS indicates not only the product, flowers, but
also the service, a nationwide network taking orders for and delivering flowers.
"FLOWERS," in that scenario, signifies more than just floral arrangements. In
the 1-800 FLOWERS context, "FLOWERS" is used to identify a convenient
means of ordering flowers from anywhere in the nation and sending them
anywhere in the nation. Because the term is multi-faceted, that mark should not
be classified as generic. Combined with secondary meaning, achieved in the
traditional manner of continuous and exclusive use in commerce, product
104. See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickrnan, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) ("chocolate fudge"
generic as to diet soda).
105. DuKuyper & Zoon v. Phillips Prods. Co., No. 92-C-4996, 1993 WL 134903, at * 4 (N.D.
Ill. April 22, 1993).
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complexity makes 1-800-FLOWERS a mark of considerable strength, notwith-
standing its origins as an otherwise generic term.
To barprotection ofmnemonics that spell generic terms simply becauseof the
genericness of the term spelled ignores an important element of all trademark
analysis. When evaluating the distinctiveness of a mark and the likelihood of
confusion between two marks, the whole mark must be taken into account, not just
its parts. ,"e Mnemonics consist of more than just the term spelled. Intrinsic to
the mnemonic mark is its use as a phone number. To base the distinctiveness of
a mnemonic mark entirely upon the term spelled ignores this fundamental aspect.
The availability aspect of the genericness doctrine is also answered when the
mark is viewed as a whole. Certainly, generic terms and descriptive terms must
remain available to competitors so that they can have an adequate means to
identify their products. However, are competitors necessarily entitled to use such
a name as a phone number? Such a policy is self-defeating. With or without
trademark protection, not all competitors will be able to use the generic name of
their product as a phone number. Some products cannot be described in seven
letters or less. Those that can are still limited by the logistics inherent in the
phone number system. Within any given area code, there can be only one seven
letter mnemonic. Some area codes, particularly the toll-free area codes (1-800 and
1-888), overlap local codes. Even so, within any locality, the potential number of
identical seven letter mnemonics is three.)17 Therefore, to say that the denial of
protection to mnemonics that spell generic terms keeps those terms available to
competitors is simply not true.
This is not to say that the distinctiveness of the term utilized is irrelevant. To
the contrary, mnemonics that spell arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive terms will
indeed be stronger than those that use generic or descriptive ones. However, the
weakness of the term is not necessarily the weakness of the mark. With respect
to mnemonics that utilize generic or descriptive terms, the court should require the
holder of the mark to show secondary meaning in order to obtain protection.
However, it is important to note that these mnemonic marks can acquire secondary
meaning despite their use of weak terms. Thus, while automatic protection may
not be granted, the use of a generic term should not be fatal to a holder of a
mnemonic mark.
C How Genericness Affects Mnemonics
The driving force behind the failure to protect generic terms is the policy of
keeping those terms that are necessary to define a product, or its qualities,
106. Du Kuyper& Zoon v. Phillips Prods. Co., No. 92-C4996, 1993 WL 134903, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. April 22, 1993).
107. For instance, a local widget market could maintain WIDGETS, i-800-W1DGETS, and I-
888-WIDGETS. In order for any other seller of widgets to use WIDGETS as a phone number he
would have to attach it to another area code outside of the locality, or use one of the limited premium
toll numbers such as 1-900.
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available to all competitors.""~ Certain terms are so inherent to a product that
to protect one producer's use of them would have a grave impact upon all other
producers in that market. If other producers are denied these terms, they are left
with no means to identify their products without infringing upon the protected
term.'"
When the term is used in a mnemonic, however, protection of the mnemonic
does not run afoul of this policy. If a generic term is used as a phone number,
the holder of that number is certainly not entitled to remove that term from com-
merce." ' However, if the protection is limited to the narrow scope of mne-
monics, the term remains available in all other contexts. Competitors are free
to use the term to describe their products in any advertising medium. What they
are not free to do is use the term as a phone number in the same market as the
holder of the mnemonic mark."'
D. Public Perception Test
At the heart of trademark protection is public perception. If the policies
behind trademarks are to protect the consumer from confusion and to protect the
producer's goodwill generated through the use of the mark, then the meaning the
consumer attaches to the mark is crucial to trademark analysis. The spectrum of
public perception runs from source-indicative to product-indicative. If a mark
answers the question "Who are you?" or "Where do you come from?" it is
source-indicative."' If it only answers the question, "What are you?" without
telling the consumer the product's origin, it is product-indicative."' If
the public associates the mark with the holder, then the mark is protect-
able." 4  If the public associates it merely with the product itself, and
not any particular producer, then the mark is weak, possibly too weak to
be protected.'s
The public perception test was first created by Judge Learned Hand in Bayer
Co. v. United Drug Co."' Judge Hand, holding that ASPIRIN is generic,
declared: "The single question, as I view it, is merely one of fact: What do
buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending?"",
This question is central to all trademark analysis. By categorizing a term, the
courts attempt to answer Judge Hand's question.
108. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 856-57 (3d Cir. 1992).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 97-104.
110. Dial-a-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1989).
111. Id.
112. McCarthy, supra note 11, § 12:1, at 520.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
117. Id. at 509.
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The test was further polished in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.",
While determining the trademark status of the term "shredded wheat," the Court
declared that in order for a term to receive trademark protection its primary
significance, in the minds of the consumer, must be the producer not the
product. " Thus, a mark cannot be equally source-indicative and product-
indicative. Rather, its primary function must be to indicate the source of the
product.' 0
The percentage of the consuming public that must recognize the term as
source-indicative was determined in Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products
Co.' There, the court determined that the term "cellophane" was generic
because the majority of consumers only recognized the term as indicative of the
product without recognizing it as Dupont's product.' Thus, a mark must not
only be primarily source-indicative, but it must be so in the minds of the majority
of the consumers in the pertinent market.' 3
The public perception test is at the core of the four categories of trademark
protection." ' When evaluating a mark, the courts categorize it based on an
assumption of public perception. Arbitrary marks are certainly source-indicative
in the majority of consumers' minds, because the connection between the mark
and the product source could not otherwise be made. At the other extreme,
generic terms must fail the public perception test, because no consumer could
associate those terms with any one producer.'25
. Mnemonics have an advantage in this regard, because they are always source-
indicative. The public cannot associate a phone number, or a clever way of
dialing that number, without thinking about the product source at the other end of
the call. Thus, if asked whether 1-800-FLOWERS describes flowers in general
or a particular source of floral arrangements, a consumer will certainly recognize
1-800-FLOWERS as a means of contacting a particular source of flowers, if not
the source itself.
Because of this inherent quality, particular to mnemonics, mnemonics that
spell out generic terms might indeed deserve protection. While the generic term
118. 302 U.S. I11, 59 S. Ct. 109(1938).
119. Id. at117,59S. Ctatl13.
120. Id.
121. 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936).
122. Id. at 82.
123. McCarthy, supra note I1, § 12:2, at 523.
1 24. The public perception test has been attacked by commentators because of proof difficulties.
Proof of public perception generally relies on market surveys. These surveys often are confusing and
fail to take into account brand distinctions, etc. See Terry Ann Smith, Comment, Telephone Numbers
that Spell Generic Terms: A Protectable Trademark or an Invitation to Monopolize a Market?, 28
U.S.F. L. Rev. 1079, 1096 n.125 (1994). Notwithstanding these implementation problems, the root
of trademark protection is public perception.
125. Unless that producer was a monopolist. This situation, however, would be in violation of
Section 2 of The Sherman Antitrust Act. That raises questions in that body of trade regulation which
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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should not be removed from commerce through absolute protection, a producer
could have the mnemonic protected from other confusingly similar mnemonics.
Because protecting the mnemonic does not remove the term spelled from
commerce, protecting a mnemonic that spells a generic term would not have the
detrimental effects to competitors that flow from absolute protection of a generic
term as a trademark.
III. TREATMENT BY THE COURTS
Mnemonic trademarks have only recently become an issue for the courts.
While mnemonics have been in use for some time, there is little case law on the
subject of protecting the mnemonic itself. Earlier phone number cases dealt with
mnemonics infringing on traditional word marks, but did not address whether a
mnemonic itself could be protected."'
Three of the federal circuits have decided cases dealing with the issue of
protection of mnemonics as trademarks." 7 Their analyses yielded varying
results. The Second Circuit found such marks to be protectable with little
analysis.'23 The Third Circuit held that mnemonics are subject to the same
analysis as other traditional word trademarks, with those mnemonics utilizing
generic terms being denied protection.'" Finally, the Sixth Circuit, based not
on analysis but on a defendant's concession, found that mnemonics are subject
to trademark protection.'"O These cases not only show how courts have
responded to mnemonics as trademarks, but also show how tangled the issues
that arise from this question can be.
A. Dial-A-Mattress: Our Story Begins
In Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page,"' the Second Circuit
was faced with two competitors, both seeking trademark protection for their
mnemonics. Plaintiff, a retail mattress dealer whose business came
primarily from telephone orders, used the mnemonic MATTRES in various
area codes in the New York metropolitan area. 32 Plaintiff had previous-
ly sought to obtain an 800 number that corresponded to its mnemonic to
126. See American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-AMERICAN Corp.. 622 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (use of 1-800-AMERICAN found to infringe on American Airlines' trademarks); and Sodima
v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839 (D. Or. 1987) (1-800-YO-CREAM found to infringe
on the trademark "Yoplait").
127. Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989); Dranoff-Peristein
Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992); and Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86'
F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996).
128. Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
129. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 857 (3d Cir. 1992).
130. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 625 (6th Cir. 1996).
131. 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
132. Id. at 676.
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increase its business with toll-free calls, but that particular number was then
unavailable.
Defendant, Anthony Page, originally a seller of a reclining sofa bed, had
recently expanded into the mattress business."' Although he was fully aware
of Dial-A-Mattress' use of the mnemonic "MATTRES" in the New York area,
he sought an 800 number that spelled out MATTRES.' 3" When he discovered
that the number was unavailable, he found a number that contained the first three
letters (MAT) and then exchanged the last four digits with the holder of the full
number. 1
36
Both parties promoted their numbers as mnemonics through various means
of advertisement.' Plaintiff told consumers to dial MATTRES and to "drop
the S, for savings"; defendant promoted his mnemonic as 1-800-MATTRESS 3
Plaintiff filed suit in the Eastern District of New York, claiming trademark
infringement and unfair competition.'39 The district court held that Dial-A-
Mattress had trademark rights in their mnemonic."' It ordered Page to notify
the phone company to limit his 800 service so that no calls could be received
from those area codes wherein Dial-A-Mattress had used the mnemonic. "'
The pivotal issue on appeal was whether Dial-A-Mattress could obtain
judicial protection for its mnemonic where the term spelled was a generic
term."" The court held that Dial-A-Mattress indeed had trademark rights in
the telephone number, and subsequently upheld the preliminary injunction issued
below. "'
The court rejected the notion that the mnemonic might be denied protection
because it utilized a generic term, noting the limited impact of extending
protection to phone numbers. Accordingly, the court found that the rationale for
denying protection of generic terms in other contexts is inapplicable in the
context of mnemonics.'" According to the court, protecting plaintiff's
mnemonic did not remove the word MATTRES(S) from commerce."5 Rather,
it merely protected plaintiff against "a competitor's use of a confusingly similar
phone number and a confusingly similar means of identifying that number.""' 6
133. Id.
134. Id. at 677.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 676-77. Note that the additional letter in a mnemonic does not affect the ability of
consumers to complete the call.
139. Id. at 677.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 678.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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This notion of limited protection available to mnemonics is central to the
arguments for their protection, particularly when the mnemonic spells out a
generic term. Because the mnemonic, not the term itself, is protected, many of
the policies behind keeping generic terms available to competitors are not
threatened by protecting mnemonics. 4 The Second Circuit recognized this
and was therefore quick to protect Dial-A-Mattress' mnemonic irrespective of the
fact that it used the generic term "MATTRES." Unfortunately, the court did not
analyze the possible impact of protecting a mnemonic based on a generic term.
In fact, the court did not analyze the strength of Dial-A-Mattress' mark at all.
Without any analysis of the mark, the Second Circuit's position was weak, and
offered little guidance for subsequent courts. While the result in Dial-A-Mattress
is probably the correct one, the court's analysis was inadequate.
The Second Circuit made many assumptions. The court assumed the
mnemonic involved was protectable.' 4 Not all numbers that spell generic
terms deserve protection.49 While some generic terms should be protected, the
strength of the mark must still be determined. Many mnemonics that use generic
terms could certainly be so weak that they are "merely descriptive" under the
Lanham Act.' 50 These marks, without secondary meaning, would not be
protected.' 5' This determination was not made by the Second Circuit in Dial-
A-Mattress.
B. Dranoff-Perlstein: The Plot Thickens
The Third Circuit took a markedly different approach to mnemonic
protection in Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar.'52 Plaintiff, Dranoff-
Perlstein Associates, was a law firm that practiced personal injury law in the
Delaware Valley."' Since 1984, it had used the mnemonic INJURY-I as its
phone number, and promoted it in newspaper and radio advertisements."
Defendant, Harris J. Sklar, was also a personal injury lawyer who, in 1990,
started promoting his practice by using the mnemonic INJURY-9 and advertising
it through similar local media."
In May of 1990, both parties applied for registration for their respective
mnemonics as service marks on the principle register at the United States Patent
147. See supra text accompanying notes 108-1 1I.
148. Dial-A-Mattress, 880 F.2d at 677-78.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
151.. This is often the case with partial mnemonics where only part of the number is used to spell
out a word (example: 555-ARMS (for a pistol range)). With these numbers many competitors share
the partial mnemonic and therefore do not use the mnemonic exclusively. Without exclusive use,
it may be difficult to generate secondary meanings.
152. 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992).
153. Id. at 853.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 854.
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and Trademark Office." In July of that same year, Dranoff-Perlstein filed suit
against Sklar for unfair competition and trademark infringement.'57  The
district court found that both marks were functional and generic.'58 Therefore,
they were not subject to trademark protection.'59 Alternatively, the court found
that if the marks were descriptive, that no showing of "secondary meaning" had
been made or could be made.'"
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejectedDial-A-Mattress' holding that telephone
numbers correlating to generic terms may be subject to trademark protection.' 6'
The court found that the technical aspects of telecommunications did not alter the
trademark analysis used in other contexts. 6 2 Thus, in the Third Circuit,
mnemonics must satisfy traditional trademark analysis in order to receive
protection.
The court then analyzed the marks "INJURY-l" and "INJURY-9" to
determine which category of mark applied.'63 It quickly determined that they
were not arbitrary or fanciful as they bore some "logical or suggestive relation"
to the services supplied by the holders.'" Because little or no imagination was
required to associate the term "injury" to personal injury legal services, neither
mark could be described as "suggestive."""
In its determination of whether the term "injury" was generic or descriptive
vis-a-vis personal injury lawyers, the court looked to A.J. Canfield Co. v.
Honickman,'" a case in which the term "chocolate fudge" was found to be a
generic term not subject to trademark protection in the diet soda market. 67
There, the court determined that "chocolate fudge" could not be protected as a
trademark because it would deny other manufacturers of similarly flavored
soft drinks a term vital to the marketing of that product.'" The court then
determined that the relationship between the term "injury" and the market
of personal injury law was such that, in that context, "injury" was also
' 69generic.
After detailed analysis of "injury" under the traditional trademark standards
for words, the court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the
addition of the suffixes "-1" and/or "-9" created any likelihood of confusion
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 857.
162. Id. at 855.
163. Id. at 857.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 858.
166. 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986).
167. 967 F.2d at 855.
168. A. Canfleld Co., 808 F.2d at 306.
169. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 860 (3d Cir. 1992).
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between the two sources of legal services and whether any secondary meaning
could be established.17
While this court's analysis of the term "injury" is detailed, the court misses
the point of mnemonics as trademarks. Holders of mnemonic marks do not seek
to protect the term absolutely, neither can they realistically expect to remove the
term from commerce. What is generally sought is protection of a mnemonic
utilizing the term; therefore the court's analysis of the term above is somewhat
irrelevant.
Dranoff-Peristein offers a question that was not pondered by the court: did
either parties' use of INJURY consist of trademark use? As law firms, the
parties used the number as a means for new clients to hire them. It is possible
that little actual business was conducted over the phone. Therefore, little
goodwill could be generated through that mnemonic. If the number was not
serving as a trademark, then no protection would be warranted no matter how
unique the term used. 7' Had the court taken this approach, it could have
reached the same result without deciding that mneumonics based upon generic
terms are not protectable.
By ignoring the actual use of the mnemonic and, instead, focusing on a
detailed analysis of the term used, the Third Circuit's decision, while perhaps
correct on the facts before it, bodes ill for many mnemonic marks. An absolute
bar to the protection of mnemonics that spell generic terms totally ignores the
telecommunication aspects of mnemonics, treating these marks as mere word
marks. This folly would force mnemonics to be protectable as words but only
actually protected as mnemonics. Accordingly, plaintiffs would have to prove
their marks were inordinately stronger than necessary, in that the mnemonic
would have to be distinctive enough to allow the word spelled to be removed
from commerce, when in actuality the word would remain available for all non-
mnemonic uses.
C. Holiday Inns: A New Chapter, or a New Story?
In Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation Inc., 72 the Sixth Circuit ad-
dressed a complaint by Holiday Inns, Inc. of trademark infringement and unfair
competition. Holiday Inns, the nationwide hotel chain, claimed that defendants
used a phone number that was deceptively similar to its reservation hot line, I-
800-HOLIDAY (465-4329).' 73 The defendant, Call Management Systems,
operated a "service bureau" that assisted business customers in obtaining and
operating 800 phone numbers.' 7' Albert Montrueil, the fifty percent owner of
170. Id. at 862.
171. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 863 (3d Cir. 1992) (Stapleton, J.,
concurring).
172. 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996).
173. Id. at 620.
174. Id.
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Call Management, admitted that one of the most common mistakes made by
consumers is to dial zero instead of the letter "0.' 75 Well aware of this
phenomenon, Montrueil discovered that the number 1-800-405-4329 (H-zero-
LIDAY) was available and reserved that number for potential customers." 6
Soon thereafter, Call Management made arrangements with two different
reservations firms, Earthwinds Travel, Inc. and 800 Reservations, Inc., to process
calls for them through this number.'" None of the defendants ever advertised
their phone number as a mnemonic.' 8 With the exception of a three week run
of a small classified ad in a nationwide newspaper, the firms never advertised
their phone number at all." 9 Defendants fully admitted that their entire
business relied upon the misdialings of Holiday Inn's customers.'" Were it
not for Holiday Inns' multi million-dollar annual advertising budget, defendants
would have had no customers.'8 '
Because of this parasitic arrangement, Holiday Inns alleged that 800
Reservations violated the Lanham Act by "using" Holiday Inns' trademark." 2
Defendants argued that while they indeed benefited from the advertising
efforts of Holiday Inns, they never used any of Holiday Inns' trademarks
nor any variants thereof; rather, they only used the phone number 1-800-405-
4329."8
The court, in analyzing Holiday Inns' claim, looked at both Dial-A-Mattress
and Dranoff-Perlstein, yet managed to distinguish both cases."' The court
found that the Second Circuit's holding regarding the protection of mnemonics
as trademarks was easily distinguishable because both parties in Dial-A-Mattress
had promoted identical mnemonics, thus creating confusion."' The Third
Circuit's holding, that mnemonics are protectable if they have acquired secondary
meaning,' was irrelevant to the Holiday Inns court because defendants
conceded that Holiday Inns had trademark rights in 1-800-HOLIDAY." 7 Thus,
the court managed to disregard both federal circuit cases dealing with trademark
rights in mnemonics.
175. Id. at 621. The letter "0" is the number 6 on a telephone keypad.
176. Id.
177. Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 621.
178. Id. at 623-24.
179. Id. at 624 n.6.
180. Id. at 621.
181. Id. at 624.
182. Id. at 623.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 624.
186. Note that this is a rather inaccurate citing of that case. The Third Circuit held that generic
mnemonics are not protected and that descriptive marks Would only be protected if the mark had
acquired secondary meaning. That mnemonics involve special technology was of little consequence
to the Third Circuit's analysis. See discussion supra at notes 152-171.
187. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992).
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The court was instead persuaded by a line of cases that suggest active
promotion of a mnemonic is necessary to infringe on another's trademark
rights. 8 Specifically, the court relied on American Airlines v. A 1-800-A-M-
E-R-I-C-A-N Corp. '8 That case, however, involved a travel agent who utilized
a phone number mnemonic to infringe upon a traditional trademark and said
nothing of whether mnemonics themselves could be trademarks.'"
Without addressing the potential impact of trademark protection of
mnemonics, the court held that Holiday Inns did own trademark rights in its
mnemonic. 9 ' The court then found, however, no infringement on the part of
defendant under Section 32192 nor under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." 3
Defendants, according to the court, did not create any confusion; they merely
capitalized on existing confusion.' 94 The court added that Holiday Inns could
have prevented such activity had it, like many other industries that use
mnemonics, taken the "simple precaution" of reserving the complementary
number used by the defendant. 9
This opinion highlights many of the issues surrounding trademark protection
for mnemonics. The kind of protection which should be granted to the holder
of a mnemonic mark is exemplified here. Defendants were not infringing on
Holiday Inns' mnemonic trademark, because they used no mnemonic themselves.
This type of limited protection is precisely what should be granted to mnemonic
mark holders.
What is conspicuously absent from the Sixth Circuit's opinion is treatment
of the unfair competition claim. Defendants, while not infringers, were
admittedly taking a free ride on Holiday Inns' advertising efforts. Unfair
competition includes a wide range of unfair practices generally described as a
"misappropriation of the skill, expenditures, and labor of another."'' Defen-
dants were indeed misappropriating the skill, expenditures, and labor that went
into Holiday Inns' massive advertising campaign. Surely, this could be included
in the broader definition of unfair competition. Plaintiff included a claim for
unfair competition,'97 but the court spoke only in terms of trademark infringe-
ment. While trademark protection would have been inappropriate, unfair
competition should have barred defendant from using the misleading phone
number in such a way as to appropriate the benefits of plaintiff's advertising.
188. Id. at 624-25.
189. American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-1-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. III.
1985).
190. Id.
191. Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 625.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. 1997). This portion of the Lanham Trademark Act provides an
action for infringement on registered trademarks.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1997).
194. Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 625.
195. Id.
196. Murphy Door Bed Co. Inc. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1989).
197. Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 620.
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IV. OTHER TREATMENT OF THIS ISSUE
Commentary surrounding this topic has generally been in accordance with
the Third Circuit's holding that mnemonics that correspond to generic terms
should never be protected. 9 The arguments against protecting mnemonics fall
into three basic categories. First, mnemonics should not be protected because
they are not associated with the product in the same manner as trademarks
traditionally are." Second, it is argued that mnemonics are derived from a
necessarily finite pool and therefore are susceptible to depletion.2"o Finally, it
is urged that, because mnemonics are similar to serial numbers, legal principles
generated in that area should be applied to mnemonic marks; specifically, all
mnemonics should be burdened with a presumption of descriptiveness except
those that utilize generic terms, which should never be protected.2"'
A. Lack of Association with the Product
One argument against the protection of mnemonics is that they are not
associated with a product. 2 In some cases, the mnemonic is so separate from
the product that it cannot be protected as a trademark.0 3 This is particularly
true in the case of a traditional retailer. Contrast the following two situations.
Mutt and Jeff are both in the business of widget sales and service. Mutt, a
traditional retailer, sells widgets from a retail store. His customers come in and
purchase the widgets over the counter. Jeff, on the other hand, sells widgets
through phone sales. Jeff's customers never see him or his employees. The
customers place their orders by phone and receive their goods through mail
delivery. If they need service or want to purchase more widgets, they call Jeff
on the telephone because there is no geographic location to go to, as far as the
customer is concerned.
Mutt obtains the number 1-800-WIDGETS, and Jeff obtains 1-888-
WIDGETS, and both producers advertise extensively through radio, TV, and
other media. As far as Mutt, the traditional retailer, and his customers are
concerned, the mnemonic is an easy way to remember the phone number to his
establishment. They will only call that number, however, if they are interested
in determining where the store is located or need information about sales.
Whether they purchase widgets from Mutt will be determined far more by their
experiences within the retail establishment than by their experiences over the
phone. Jeff s mnemonic, on the other hand, acts as the only means of contact
198. See generally Elizabeth A. Horkcy, 1-800-I-AM-VAIN: Should Telephone Mnemonics be
Protected as Trademarks?, 3 J. Intell. Prop. L. 213 (1995); and Smith, supra note 124.
199. See Horkey, supra note 198, at 240.
200. Id. at 242-46.
201. Id. at 252.
202. Id. at 242.46.
203. Id. at 241.
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between his operation and the public. If a consumer wants to buy widgets from
Jeff, they will call his mnemonic. If they need more widgets or services for the
widgets they have already bought, they will call the mnemonic. Any goodwill
generated by Jeff will be generated through the use of his mnemonic. Thus,
Jeff's mnemonic acts as a trademark while Mutt's does not.
As the Mutt and Jeff hypothetical indicates, mnemonic trademarks add a step
to the trademark analysis. Before the mnemonic can be classified, it must be
determined whether it is being used as a trademark at all. A mark cannot be
protected if it does not fulfill its central purpose of source-identification.2 On
the other hand, many mnemonics are a producer's sole method of market
participation. Examples include 1-800-FLOWERS and Jeffs widget business in
the above hypo.
The courts have not looked to the manner of use in mnemonic cases,
probably because the manner of use of trademarks is generally obvious. In
traditional trademark cases the mark is affixed to the product or is prominently
displayed in an advertisement and is clearly used to identify services. Telephone
mnemonics are not always so clear. In. Dranoff-Perlstein, the numbers
"INJURY-I" and "INJURY-9" were not subjected to this kind of analysis,
although, in a concurring opinion, Judge Stapleton did acknowledge that some
mnemonics might not act as trademarks and would be denied protection."'
This additional step in analyzing mnemonics as trademarks would create a
continuum upon which mnemonics could be placed. Those mnemonics that are
intrinsic to the service marked, such as MCI's 1-800-COLLECT, clearly act as
trademarks. Those used merely as a phone number for a traditional retail
establishment do not act as trademarks. Many mnemonics will fall somewhere
in between. Reservations and telemarketing benefit greatly from telephone
number mnemonics as the telephone is intrinsic to the services that they provide.
Similarly, hotlines also benefit from easily remembered mnemonics. In these
industries, the mnemonic may deserve protection as a trademark, so long as it
meets trademark requirements. Those mnemonics that do not act as trademarks
will fail this threshold requirement, and thus receive no protection at all. Where
a mnemonic" falls in between these two antipodes will have relevance in
determining secondary meaning and other factors in the actual trademark
categorization.
B. Depletion Theory
Commentators have been hesitantto protect telephone number mnemonics
and have been hostile towards protecting those that spell out generic terms.2
204. George J. Alexander, Commercial Torts 13 (2d ed. 1988).
205. Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 863 (3d Cir. 1992) (Stapleton, J.,
concurring).
206. See generally Horkey, supra note 198 and Smith, supra note 124.
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Most of their arguments are derived from the theory of anti-competitive
depletion. Depletion theory, in the realm of mnemonics, is concerned with the
fact that a finite number of mnemonics exist, and if one holder of a mnemonic
achieves trademark protection, then other holders will soon follow, and there will
eventually be no mnemonics left available to new or existing competitors in the
market." 7 Based upon this depletion theory, several objections to the protec-
tion of mnemonics that spell generic terms have been advanced.208
One extreme application of the depletion theory suggests that, by granting
protection of a mnemonic that utilizes a generic term, the courts would allow that
holder to gain a monopoly on the relevant market.209 The crux of this argu-
ment is that protecting a mnemonic that spells a generic term is tantamount to
protecting the term itself. Because the generic term would no longer be available
to competitors, the holder of that mark would have a unique advantage over his
competitors, and the protection of his mark would facilitate monopolization of
the market.
The idea that protecting a mnemonic as a trademark would somehow confer
a monopoly on the holder is simplistic at best. Those terms that are generic to
the product market do not necessarily make mnemonics based on those terms
generic. Protecting the term as a mnemonic will not prevent other producers in
the relevant market from using the term in commerce. Competitors will still be
able to use the term in advertising in any number of mediums. They will only
be precluded from utilizing such a term as a phone number, if such use would
create confusion in the relevant market.
Because infringement against a mnemonic trademark could only be carried
out through another mnemonic, few competitors would actually be impacted. If
Jeff holds 1-888-WIDGETS, he will only preclude others in the widget markets
that he is involved in from acquiring that number or numbers that are likely to
cause confusion among consumers. A competitor is perfectly able to acquire I-
800-GIZMOES to compete. Moreover, 1-888-WIDGETS, while not generic,
would probably be descriptive, which would require Jeff to prove secondary
meaning in order to have a protectable mark. If Jeff proves secondary meaning,
his mark is not associated merely with the product (generic) but carries goodwill
because of Jeff's commercial efforts.
Depletion theory revolves around the idea that because there are only a
limited number of combinations on the phone pad, the options are limited.
Therefore, we should be hesitant to protect mnemonics as opposed to other
marks. Ironically, depletion is exaggerated by the current lack of protection.
Because a firm cannot be confident that its mnemonic will be protected, it is
encouraged to purchase those numbers that complement the mnemonic it
207. Horkey, supra note 198, at 244 n.159.
208. See generally Horkey, supra note 198 and Smith, supra note 124.
209. See generally Smith, supra note 124.
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advertises."* Thus, rather than removing one number from the pool, two,
three, or more numbers are removed in a sort of "trademark self-help."
(Depletion is exacerbated by the variety of markets available and term
crossover.)
For any one seven-letter mnemonic, there are only two or three choices
available without protection (i.e. local, 1-800, and 1-888). Therefore, depletion
exists without trademark protection. Because protection would encourage firms
to use only one number, it could serve to eliminate the self-help practices of
large businesses.
C. The Serial.Number Analogy
Another argument put forth to restrict protection of telephone number
mnemonics is that they are similar to serial numbers and should therefore carry
the presumption of descriptiveness that burden serial number marks.2 '
Because both serial number marks and mnemonics are not used to designate
the goods of a producer, serial numbers, and their treatment under trademark law,
have been put forward as a source for an analogous solution to mnemonic
trademark issues.212 Serial numbers distinguish between different goods from
the same producer, but are ancillary to the manufacturer's main trademark.1 3
Mnemonics have been likened to these numbers because the mnemonic seldom
is the trade name of the business, but is merely a means of communication. The
goods are generally not marked with the mnemonic and thus are not associated
with the mnemonic mark.
2'14
Because serial numbers are used in conjunction with other, usually stronger,
marks and are used primarily to distinguish different goods from the same
producer, they carry a presumption of descriptiveness when asserted as trade-
marks.215 This model has been offered as a means to determine the strength
of mnemonic trademarks.)
Forcing mnemonics into the same legal role as serial numbers is impractical
because it fails to address a growing section of the modem market. Telemarket-
ing, information hot-lines, and telecommunications services are among the wide
variety of services that utilize mnemonics in a trademark capacity.' 7 In many
210. See supra text accompanying notes 194-195.
211. Horkcy, supra note 198, at 252.
212. Id.
213. For example, Sig Sauer, a maker of semi-automatic handguns carries the P226, a full size
9mm handgun, and a P228, a compact version. The serial numbers P226 and P228 might be
trademarks of Sig Sauer, but are secondary to the Sig Sauer mark.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 202-205.
215. Horkey, supra note 198, at 220-27.
216. Id.
217. 1-800-FLOWERS (flower delivery), 1-800-CLARIT1N (pharmaceutical information line),
and 1-800-COLLECT (collect calling service) are examples of specific nmemonics in each of the
named categories.
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of these, the mnemonic is the name of the producer or is closely associated with
that finn's service. These mnemonics are not means for the customer to connect
with a service. Rather, they are inextricably meshed with the service themselves.
They serve not to distinguish different services from the same producer but to
distinguish one producer's service from the next, the quintessential function of
a trademark.
While in some markets, especially traditional retail establishments similar to
Mutt's in the above hypo,"' a mnemonic may be nothing more than a clever
way to get in touch with a firm without a transaction or service occurring over
the phone, a significant portion of the mnemonics are not. Those mnemonics
that are separate from a transaction or service simply will not function as
trademarks. If so, it matters not whether they are descriptive, generic, or even
arbitrary. If they are not functioning as trademarks, then they should receive no
protection.
Mnemonics have also been compared to serial numbers because both are
almost always used in conjunction with another mark." 9 Because the serial
number is usually juxtaposed with the name of the producer, the serial number
is weakened as a mark alone. For instance, the Mazda 929 is a luxury
automobile made by Mazda but distinguished from Mazda's other cars by the
model number "929". Because most, if not all, of Mazda's advertising efforts
refer to the car as the "Mazda 929" rather than just "929," "929" on its own is
a very weak mark.
Similarly, telephone mnemonics are often used in conjunction with a trade
name or other mark, and commentators have suggested that this weakens their
status as trademarks."2 Those same commentators have gone further to
suggest that this common practice among holders of mnemonic marks warrants
a presumption of descriptiveness to represent this weakness. 2 1
This presumption is entirely too broad. While many mnemonics are used in
conjunction with another mark, this is merely a factor in determining the strength
of that mark, and should therefore be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Some
firms have used the mnemonic as the trade name of the company;22 other
mnemonics are advertised with no reference to the company that holds them.223
These marks are not weakened by conjunctive use with another mark and should
not be burdened with a presumption of weakness. Those marks that are used in
conjunction with a trade name or other trademark should merely suffer the natural
218. See supra text accompanying notes 202-205.
219. Horkey, supra note 198, at 241.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. For instance,. 1-800-FLOWERS is not only the phone number to reach that company, it is
also that company's corporate name.
223. An example of this is 1-800-COLLECT, MCI's collect calling service. In the many
advertisements for this number, none of them makes clear that the service is produced by MCI.
Thus, 1-800-COLLECT is not used in conjunction with any other mark.
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consequences. Because they are not used on their own they may be weaker than
those mnemonics that are. These marks may achieve strength in other ways,
however. They may use terms that are arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive. The
holder may just have to invest more time, money, and effort in a blitzkrieg
advertising campaign. In any event, whether the mnemonic is used in conjunction
with another mark is a matter of individual evaluation, and not consistent enough
to warrant a presumption that condemns all mnemonic marks.
These similarities to serial numbers do not support the presumption of
descriptiveness suggested.224 Under this presumption, those marks that use
arbitrary or fanciful terms will be presumed descriptive, with no deference given
to the strength of the term used. Also, those mnemonics that are derived from
existing trademarks (i.e., 1-800-HOLIDAY) are now delegated to descriptive
status, even if they were derived from arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive marks.
Moreover, if the existing trademark was descriptive with secondary meaning,
does the mnemonic get to utilize the secondary meaning of the word mark, or
must it achieve it separately?
Serial numbers and mnemonic trademarks raise different questions and,
therefore, require different solutions. A presumption of descriptiveness may
work in the realm of serial number marks, but is inadequate for mnemonics.
V. CONCLUSION
Telephone number mnemonics operate in many industries as trademarks, but
they do so only in a very narrow medium. The narrowness of this medium
offers the potential to protect these trademarks where analogous word marks
might not be protectable. Mnemonic trademarks should only be protected from
other mnemonics. Other forms of infringement, such as use of a similar phone
number but not the corresponding mnemonic, should be policed through unfair
competition law. Thus, unfair competition, while insufficient as the only means
of protecting mnemonic marks, can supplement the narrow protection given to
mnemonic trademarks.
Courts and commentators have struggled with the idea of protecting these
marks because of fears of depletion coupled with the new technology utilized in
carrying the marks. However, neither depletion nor technology should be
obstacles to extending protection. Traditional, well-founded principles of
trademark law are more than capable of ensuring proper protection for both the
mnemonic mark and its market.
Technology only adds one step to the analysis of a mnemonic mark: is it
being used to mark goods or services? If so, then the standard tests of
distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion should determine whether trademark
protection is warranted. If not, then its failure to act as a trademark should bar
its protection, rather than the technology involved.
224. Horkey, supra note 198, at 252.
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Depletion, of particular concern when a generic term is utilized in a
mnemonic, also should not obstruct protection. The limited medium in which
mnemonic marks operate is not only that which suggests depletion issues, but is
also that which limits the scope of potential depletion. Protecting a mnemonic
that uses a generic term does not remove that term from commerce. On the
other hand, not protecting mnemonics encourages those who use mnemonics to
abuse the limited resource of phone numbers to protect themselves where the law
is hesitant to do so by purchasing numbers that they do not need. In this sense,
a policy against depletion is forwarded by extending protection rather than
denying it.
The "information age" is so named because information is a product and a
service. As demand for this new commodity increases, competitors, both old and
new, need a means with which to identify their wares and distinguish them from
others'. Traditionally trademarks have been the weapon of choice for such
protection. Despite technological advances, trademark law can adapt and
continue to protect this new generation of producers and consumers, but only if
it is allowed to do so.
J. Michael Monahan
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